Institutional argumentation and conflict prevention: The case of the Swiss Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner by Greco, S et al.
Institutional argumentation and conflict prevention: The case of the Swiss Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner

Sara Greco, Università della Svizzera italiana
Rudi Palmieri, University of Liverpool
Eddo Rigotti, Università della Svizzera italiana

Draft version – please do not cite. Please check the final version on the homepage of the Journal of Pragmatics.
Abstract
By focusing on a case study of institutional argumentation in the sector of data protection and transparency, this paper offers a view on the role of institutional argumentative discourse aimed at conflict prevention in public organizations. In particular, the context we are analyzing is that of a Swiss institutional role named Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner (FDPIC). Among other tasks, the person who serves as a FDPIC has the right to monitor data protection in the whole territory of the Swiss Confederation, with the possibility of issuing recommendations to subjects who are found in violation of the law on this matter. The FDPIC’s role appears similar to that of ombudsmen; his or her recommendations are not binding for the parties, but they represent powerful argument-based warnings that serve the function of preventing escalation to a court proceeding. The specific nature of this type of recommendation is explored in this paper both at the level of a semantic-pragmatic analysis of the speech act “to recommend”, and at the level of argumentation. Integrating an argumentative level is necessary to fully explain the intended effect of this specific type of speech act of recommendation in this context. Argumentation is also advanced by the FDPIC to support his decision: by devising a comprehensive, convincing and well-structured argumentative discourse, the FDPIC pursues the ultimate pragmatic goal of preventing the emergence of conflicts between citizens and legal authorities.
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1.	Introduction

In this paper we set out to analyze a case of institutional argumentation in the context of the legislation on transparency (freedom of information) and data protection. The analysis of an argumentatively grounded decision by the Swiss Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner (henceforth: FDPIC) will serve as a case in point of one of the important roles that argumentative discourse plays in public organizations, i.e. the prevention of conflict. More specifically, we will examine how institutions adopt argumentation-based practices that serve the purpose of resolving or preventing conflict, in line with an orientation towards the instruments belonging to what is known as Alternative Dispute Resolution. In fact, the case we are considering represents a typical instance of an institutional discursive practice that has been established with the aim to prevent the escalation of potential disputes, which could easily end up as cases to be treated in court (Felstiner, Abel and Sarat 1980-81). Institutions and public organizations often take precautions with types of interventions, such as for example ombudsman services (cf. Moffitt and Bordone 2005), with the aim of preventing or resolving conflict internally before it escalates to a litigation process (cf. for example the discussion in Rojot, Le Flanchet and Landrieux-Kartochian 2005).

More specific, as stated above, the case we are considering is taken from the domain of data protection (connected to issues of privacy) and transparency, which are currently very important issues of organizational life in the public sector (cf. for instance Villeneuve 2014), not only in Switzerland but internationally. Just to give an example that shows the relevance of these aspects, in January 2012 the European Union issued a General Data Protection Regulation (IP/12/46)​[1]​. This regulation was based on a reform of previous regulations; the aim was to adapt it to current technological change. In this document, it is stated that “Rapid technological developments have brought new challenges for the protection of personal data. The scale of data sharing and collecting has increased dramatically”, especially in the online sector. For this reason, data protection plays “a central role in the Digital Agenda for Europe, and more generally in the Europe 2020 Strategy” (ibid.). Besides, in the European Union, similar institutions as the FDPIC are present in member countries; moreover, there is a dedicated European Data Protection Supervisor, whose tasks include supervision, consultation and cooperation between different countries​[2]​. 
For these two reasons – connection to practices of conflict prevention/resolution and to the theme of data protection and transparency – the case study we have chosen may be considered as a case in point of institutional practices that are currently at the center of attention not only in Switzerland but also in many other countries. More generally, investigating the case of the FDPIC from a pragmatic and argumentative viewpoint is of theoretical interest, as it enables us to understand how public organizations discursively manage to achieve the aims for which they have been created.
In particular, the core of the paper is concerned with the analysis of a text issued by the FDPIC, namely a recommendation sent to one party in order to have him comply with current legislation of data protection. Recommendation is a typical textual genre for the FDPIC (and similar figures, such as ombudsman), aimed at preventing the escalation of potential disputes into litigation processes; and, thus, aimed at preventing overt conflict. At the theoretical and methodological levels, the recommendation will be tackled both at the semantic-pragmatic level and at the level of argument schemes. In fact, the FDPIC’s recommendation is a specific speech act – very much dependent on the institutional context, which defines its specific characteristics (section 3.2). This speech act is argumentative because it invites the reader to make an inference. Therefore, a semantic-pragmatic analysis would not be complete without adding an argumentative level of how the recommendation works. The argumentative analysis also includes the argument used by the FDPIC to support his decision. Therefore, combining a semantic-pragmatic analysis of the speech act of recommendation with an argumentative analysis will allow for a better understanding of the pragmatic function of the recommendation issued by the FDPIC. In this sense, a theoretical and methodological add-on of this work is to present one possible integration of a semantic-pragmatic analysis and an argumentative analysis.

We will proceed as follows. First, in section 2, we will discuss the role of argumentation in institutions from a theoretical perspective, focusing on the function of preventing and resolving conflicts, understood as unexpected events that may arise in organizations (section 2.3). Second, we will outline the main features of the institutional context of this case, by focusing in particular on the FDPIC (section 3.1). In section 3.2, we will introduce the case study we are analyzing as well as present the main points of the document concerning the specific FDPIC’s recommendation considered in this paper. In section 3.3 we develop a semantic-pragmatic analysis of the higher-level illocutionary act governing the text of the recommendation. Section 4 discusses the results of our argumentative analysis, as well as completing the semantic-pragmatic analysis of recommendation with its argumentative component. Finally, some conclusions are presented in section 5.
2.	Argumentation as a resource for conflict prevention in institutions
Social reality, organizations and institutions: a terminological premise

As this paper deals with the role of argumentation in managing institutional practices, it is worth starting by clarifying the notion of institution. In ordinary language, institution often designates a public organization, where ‘public’ means ‘state-run’. However, following Searle’s theory of social reality (Searle 1995), an institution cannot be reduced to a service provided by the State, since all forms of human organizations originate from some form of human agreement and, more precisely, from a legally binding shared goal. Thus, insofar as an organization has a legal basis (in the form of statutes, contracts, etc.), it is an institution​[3]​. Families, private hospitals, public and private schools, football clubs, stock markets, hedge funds, as well as credit rating agencies (just to mention a few examples), all belong to the category of institutions in the same way as public administration. Instead, we do not properly speak of institutions in mere interpersonal relations such as friendship. This does not mean that such interpersonal relations should be seen as weaker, but simply that they do not amount to a form of institution and, thus, they do not create legally enforceable commitments.

However, among different institutions, public organizations appear to have specificities in argumentative terms, especially in terms of the type of issue that they must deal with. Not coincidentally, administrative rhetoric is currently one of the poles of scientific debate on public communication (see for example Savard and Melançon 2013). Above all, public organizations are held accountable for their actions (for example, for how they spend public money) and the discussion on accountability is largely present, for example, in parliamentary debates (cf. Mohammed 2013; Ihnen 2010) or in their public speeches (cf. Andone 2013). Because a public organization is at the core of the present paper, in the next sections we will more extensively discuss the specificities of argumentation within institutions, and public organizations in particular. More specifically, we will detail conflict prevention and conflict resolution as important aspects that institutions might treat by means of argumentation.
The functions of argumentation in the life of institutions

Institutions are communication contexts, which, on the one hand, depend on and are affected by discourse; while, on the other hand, they shape and constrain discourse (Rigotti and Rocci 2006). Within this framework, argumentative discourse is both an instrument to promote organizational change (Sillince 1999) and legitimacy (Green 2004) and a discursive action whose effectiveness and appropriateness significantly depends on the institutional context concerned (Sillince 2002; van Eemeren 2010). The recent “contextual turn” in argumentation theory starts from the acknowledgement of the mutual dependency between argumentation and its context of use. Accordingly, numerous scholars are investigating the uses of argumentation in different types of institutional fields and practices, such as legal argumentation, doctor-patient consultations, stock markets, parliaments, newspapers, etc. (see for example van Eemeren and Garssen (eds.), 2012). These studies rightly assume that argumentation is vital to the fulfilment of various kinds of goals in different types of situations emerging in an institutional context. The life of an institution – from its establishment, to its (possible) closure, going through its transformations – is permeated by communicative interactions where argumentation is often relevantly employed. Argumentation certainly intervenes when a new institution is founded, as new institutions must be justified by some form of means-end reasoning that explains why it is important to establish them. Public organizations are especially accountable in this sense (see the examples in Gobber and Palmieri 2014 and Cigada 2008). Conversely, argumentation is needed when there is a discussion about whether to close down or substantially reshape an institution (Palmieri 2012a, 2012b, 2014). 

Argumentation does not only play a role in the extremities of establishment and closure, but in the core activities of public institutions, both internally and externally, as well. Externally, public organizations are accountable for their decisions (Pasquier and Villeneuve 2012: 151ff) and therefore need to justify their decisions. In addition, sometimes, institutions might need to resort to argumentation in campaigns aimed at defending or promoting their reputation and image (see the example discussed in van Eemeren and Houtlosser 1999).

Internally, argumentation is important in routine activities; but specific argumentative interventions might be also needed in particular instances, for example, when a conflict must be resolved or prevented. This function of argumentation is particularly important, because conflicts may endanger the delicate balance of interpersonal and institutional relationships and, thus, jeopardize the very existence of an organization (Greco Morasso 2011: 89). By definition, conflicts are not foreseen in the best-case scenario of institutional communication; in fact, “normal” communication fluxes should not include conflict, because the emergence of conflicts might endanger or interrupt communicative fluxes and organizational dynamics. Thus, given the high economic and institutional costs of conflict, it is no surprise that many institutions have developed tools and procedures to avoid or prevent conflict escalation. They may do so using the so-called Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) methods, which include mediation, arbitration, and ombudsman, amongst others (see Moffitt and Bordone 2005). In general, these methods may be seen as an ideal choice for the relation between citizens and public institutions, as it is now acknowledged in several countries (Guy-Ecabert 2005). 

In the case under consideration, the Swiss Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner is a specific institution devoted to the prevention and resolution of conflicts which may possibly arise between citizens and authorities. Its activity is ideally alternative to that of the Federal court. We will explain its functions in more detail in sections 3.1 and 3.2 below.
3.	A recommendation from the Swiss Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner

In this section, we will outline the general institutional and legislative context in which the text selected for analysis was produced. In section 3.1 we will describe the institution known as Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner, while in section 3.2 we will synthetically present the context of the document of the recommendation taken into consideration in this contribution. This document is relative to the inappropriateness of a surveillance camera in a cottage. Finally, in section 3.3, we will adopt a methodology of semantic-pragmatic analysis (Rigotti, Rocci and Greco 2006) in order to specify the meaning and pragmatic function of the speech act of a recommendation in this specific context.
Raison d’être of the FDPIC

The FDPIC is a Swiss institution first established when the Federal Council proposed a bill for a Federal Act on Data Protection (FADP) to Parliament. The new Act was approved by both chambers on 19 June 1992 and came into force in 1993. In 2003, the Swiss Federal Parliament began consultations about a revision of the FADP; the modifications as well as a federal decree were adopted on 24 March 2006 and have been effective since 2008. Among them, the Swiss FDPIC is empowered to appeal any order of the Federal Chancellery or of the Departments (Ministries) if a recommendation he has made is rejected. As concerns the case considered here, Mr. Hanspeter Thür was appointed the role of FDPIC. He served as Commissioner from 2001 to 2015. At the moment, the position is held by Adrian Lobsiger​[4]​. 

Some of the many functions of the FDPIC in the domains of data protection and of transparency (freedom of information) are connected in interesting ways with different ADR practices; thus, it is related to how institutions prevent and manage conflicts. First, concerning transparency, the FDPIC “acts as mediator in the event of a disagreement” [emphasis added]. Second, in the field of data protection, as is the case in this paper, “the Commissioner can investigate facts on his own initiative or at request of a third party. Based upon these investigations, he can issue recommendations”​[5]​. When the FDPIC issues a recommendation about data protection, he or she is carrying out his or her duties of conflict prevention. In fact, the FDPIC identifies a potential source of conflict, such as a violation of the law, which might potentially harm other individuals. This is an analogous function to that of the ombudsman within organizations (Stieber 2000). Generally speaking, ombudsmen can investigate a case both if solicited and on their own initiative, and issue a final recommendation that is, however, not binding for the parties.

From the viewpoint of argumentation, when the Commissioner issues a recommendation he is expected to put forward arguments in support of his standpoint, thereby signaling an analogy between the FDPIC and ombudsman. Even if the FDPIC’s recommendation is not legally enforced by this institution directly, it is clear that the arguments he or she produces will have a weight were the case to be brought before the Federal Tribunal. The same happens with ombudsmen; in the words of Anderson (1964: 52): “The genius of the Ombudsman idea is that the holder of the office has full authority to investigate and pass judgment, but no power to enforce”. This means that reasons are passed down to the institution that will decide, should the person concerned not follow the recommendation. Obviously, the deciding court is likely to consider the ombudsman’s arguments. According to Uzqueda and Frediani (2002: 11), the success of the ombudsman depends on the public institutional commitment to this service; if public institutions are highly committed, the arguments listed in the ombudsman’s recommendation become more cogent for the addressee. 

The complex relation between argument-based recommendation and (lack of) power to enforce it constitutes a specificity of ombudsmen that is also present in the case of the FDPIC. This makes the FDPIC’s recommendation a particular speech act in semantic-pragmatic and argumentative terms. While the argumentative dimension will be discussed later, we will now briefly outline the semantic-pragmatic structure of the FDPIC’s recommendation (section 3.3). In order to do so, we will first briefly introduce the specific recommendation that we are considering as the basis of our analysis (section 3.2). 
The case: a suspicious surveillance camera in a cottage

The example of recommendation considered for our analysis was issued on 18 February 2009 and it is available on the website of the FDPIC in French (original language). As is clear from the title, the recommendation concerns a surveillance security camera installed in  Chalet SJ à C., owned by “Société Chalet SJ” (LLC), represented by Mr. J, resident in P.​[6]​  Due to space limitations, the eight page long full text is not included in this article. However, we do present an English summary for all numbered sequences that compose the document.  

The text of the recommendation is divided into three main parts. The first part (pp. 1-4) consists of a series of facts concerning the event at issue. The FDPIC establishes such facts as premises of his reasoning. In the second part (pp.4-8), the FDPIC defines the legal principles and rules (French “considérants de loi”) that are relevant for the case at issue; later, he will apply this legal framework to the considered case. The content of this part consists therefore in the justification externalized by the FDPIC for his recommendation. The reasonableness and prudency of the recommendation in itself coincides with the overarching standpoint of the text, which is formally declared in the third part (p.8). 

In accordance with a principle of permutation (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004), we will start with the last part of the text, which will enable us to identify the standpoint defended by the FDPIC. We will then come back to the functions of argumentation in the other sections of the text. As for this final part, we only report the three points that are relevant for the purpose of our analysis (our translation):

III.	On the basis of the above, the FDPIC recommends:
1.	Société SJ, represented by Mr. J, terminates the collection and the treatment of personal data by means of the surveillance camera installed in the corridor at the main floor of Cottage SJ
2.	It deletes all images recorded using the camera.
3.	It communicates to the FDPIC, within thirty days, whether it accepts or does not accept the recommendation. If it rejects it or does not comply with it, the FDPIC may refer the matter to the Federal Administrative Court for a decision.
[…]


Going back to the first part of the text, namely the part devoted to the establishment of facts, this is divided into ten points that we are going to briefly sum up in what follows. Note that while we keep the original FDPIC’s numbering, we add titles (in bold) to highlight the main focus of each point:
1.	(The entity receiving the recommendation). Société Chalet SJ (Sàrl), run by Mr. J, resident in P, has the purpose of exploiting holiday homes for activities in the audio-video domain, owns the Cottage SJ, situated in the town of C, in Canton X. The Cottage is rented out to third parties for meetings, parties, and summer camps and is regularly used by an association directed by Mr. J.
2.	(The camera). The chalet is equipped with a surveillance security camera, located on the main floor within the cottage in the corridor near the stairs that lead down. It is not located at the main entrance, but inside, close to the changing rooms and to the entrance of the showers. It films the coming and going of guests (both adults and children) continuously. It cannot be detached or moved in a way that a person is no longer in its visual field. 
3.	(Information about the camera). No information about the camera is given at the entrance of the cottage. Also, the camera is not mentioned on the website. However, the lease contract contains a clause informing customers that a surveillance camera is installed in the hallway of the main entrance to the chalet and that only the owner can have access to the images recorded by this camera, for the sole purpose of ensuring the safety of the cottage.
4.	(Discovery of the camera and first clarifying contacts). In May 2008, the FDPIC is told about the existence of this camera by client MC. Pursuant to Article 29 of the Federal Act on Data Protection (FADP), the FDPIC opens a procedure for the clarification of facts in order to assess whether or not the installation of this camera is in accordance with the requirements of the FADP. To this end, a registered mail is sent to Mr. J, asking to answer a number of questions for clarification concerning, in particular, the type of camera installed, its intended purpose, and the manner in which it is exploited.
5.	(No reply). The above mentioned receives no answer. The FDPIC sends a second letter with acknowledgment of receipt. This letter is returned to FDPIC as "unclaimed." The FDPIC then sends another registered letter with acknowledgment of receipt, which is returned without the questions being replied.
6.	(Reply and counter-reply). The FDPIC then addresses Mr. J by email, to which Mr. J replies by inquiring about the relationship existing between MC and the FDPIC; and asking whether they have filed a complaint. Possibly, Mr. J. may suspect the FDPIC of abusing his position to accommodate friends or relatives. By registered letter with acknowledgment of receipt, the FDPIC replies by explaining the purpose of the FDPIC and by pointing out that, on the basis of information available to him, the video camera in the cottage of Mr. J deserves to be investigated in order to verify its actual compliance with existing laws on data protection. 
7.	(Request of international assistance) The FDPIC asks for cooperation of the “Commission nationale de l’Informatique et Libertés” based in France”​[7]​.
8.	(Position of Mr. J). By email, Mr. J takes position by emphasizing that the leasing contract mentions the existence of the camera. He further recalls that Chalet SJ is a private property and that the tenants are free to rent the cottage or not, depending on the conditions defined in the contract. Therefore, it is not possible to claim that the presence of the camera was discovered once a tenant is in the cottage because it is mentioned in the contract. Mr. J also points out that he is the only person who can access the images by means of a connection protected by user name and password.
9.	(Reply by FDPIC). By email, the FDPIC informs Mr. J that he has only partially replied to the questions that had been sent to him, asking to complete its position. This letter remains unanswered.
10.	(Reply by CNIL). France CNIL informs the FDPIC that they had asked Association C to answer their questions but have not received a reply.

The part of the text, which we have briefly outlined here, roughly coincides with the phase of narratio as it was presented in the classical model of rhetorical speech described in the Rhetorica ad Herennium (Caplan 1954). Narratio is devoted to the reconstruction of the relevant facts, presented in the most favorable way for the arguer. In our case, we can remark for example the emphasis given to the position of the camera (close to the showers, toilets and changing rooms), which already hints to the inadequacy of this technical device for the declared purpose of guaranteeing security inside the cottage (see point 2). The next part of the FDPIC’s text consists of a careful legal justification of his decision, which is accomplished by connecting the facts narrated in the first part to the legal principles established in the FADP. The argumentative analysis of this part will be presented in section 4.

3.1.	The recommendation: a semantic-pragmatic representation

We will now analyse how the communicative act of recommendation, which is present in the text issued by the FDPIC as his main standpoint (section 3.2). In order to do so, we propose a semantic analysis (Rigotti, Rocci and Greco 2006) of the notion of recommendation, as it is used by the FDPIC in a specific sense. Our semantic analysis is done within in the framework of Congruity Theory (Rigotti and Rocci 2001), which also takes a pragmatic dimension into account. In fact, it defines the meaning of a word, such as ‘recommendation’, by reconstructing it as a speech act, i.e. an action that the writer/speaker performs within a precise social context in order to “do something” to the hearer/reader (ibid.). In general, Congruity Theory postulates that “the meaning of an utterance coincides with its intended effect, that is to say, with the change that it brings about in the context – yet more precisely in the intersubjectivity of the interlocutors” (Rigotti 2005: 77). All pragmatic and semantic structures in a text, at all levels, are respondent to this task or intended effect (Rigotti 2005: 78).

Following Congruity Theory, meaning is reconstructed in terms of predicate-argument​[8]​ structures, by eliciting the presuppositions imposed by the predicate on the semantic slots (or “argument places​[9]​”) that it foresees; and the entailments that the same predicate brings about when it is affirmed:

“The presuppositions imposed by the predicate onto its argument places are conditions of meaningfulness (or, from another point of view, of ontological possibility), and concern both the situations in which the predicate is affirmed and those in which it is negated (and the corresponding mode of being takes place and does not take place, respectively). On the contrary, the semantic implications of a predicate disappear when the predicate is negated: in fact the mode of being corresponding to the predicate, as it is negated, does not take place” (Rigotti, Rocci and Greco 2006: 261).

Thus, for example, in “Susan is drinking tea”, the predicate “to drink” foresees two semantic slots (or argument places) – x1 and x2. “To drink” also imposes presuppositions on x1 and x2: x1 must be a human being, whilst x2 must be a beverage. If the verb is affirmed, i.e. if we positively affirm “Susan is drinking tea”, this entails that x1 (Susan) takes x2 (tea) into her mouth and swallows it. Such entailment will be cancelled, were we to say that “Susan is not drinking tea”; presuppositions would stay unvaried.

Presuppositions and entailments correspond to different types of felicity conditions of a speech act (Austin 1958, Searle 1969). As our analysis of this speech act will reveal, the felicity conditions of the FDPIC recommendation include presuppositions and entailments of both directive speech acts – by which the speaker attempts to solicit an action from the hearer – and commissive speech acts – by which the speaker takes a certain kind of personal commitment towards a future action (see Searle 1969). In this sense, the meaning of ‘to recommend’ in the context of the FDPIC activity is partially different from how the same term is used in everyday language. In general, the verb ‘to recommend’ indicates something close to the act of giving a benevolent (and perhaps somewhat insistent) advice (cf. for example Searle 1975). In this sense, a grandmother might recommend her grandchildren to study more intensively. What she means to do (the entailment of her recommendation) is invite them to do something that is good for them – and intense studying is presupposed to be something good for children. 

The FDPIC’s recommendation, however, as is the case for the ombudsman’s, is a different speech act at the semantic and pragmatic level. It is a speech act more similar to a warning. In fact, in light of Art. 29.4 of the FDPA,  “If a recommendation made by the Commissioner is not complied with or is rejected, he may refer the matter to the Federal Administrative Court for a decision”. Needless to say, this might have negative consequences for the addressee of the recommendation.

It is therefore important to characterize this specific type of speech act in its meaning. In terms of Congruity Theory, the predicate ‘to recommend’ in this particular meaning foresees five semantic slots (or argument places), which we name x1…x5. The following properties corresponds to the presuppositions, i.e. the conditions imposed by the predicate to recommend onto its semantic slots (argument places). In Table 1, we represent these presuppositions and the real entities/events that occupy the semantic slots of “to recommend” in the FDPIC’s recommendation that we are considering:


Semantic slots (argument places)	Presuppositions imposed by the predicate “to recommend” onto its semantic slots (argument places)	Real entities/events that occupy the semantic slots of “to recommend” in the case considered
x1	x1 is an institutionalized entity having legal power under a certain legal framework	The FDPIC
x2	x2 is a person who has an asymmetrical legal relationship with x1 and is subject to the legal framework where x1 has power	Mr. J.
x3	x3 is an action by x2 subject for the control of x1	Mr J’s collection and treatment of data by means of the camera
x4	x4 is an initiative against x2 that x1 has the power to bring about if x3 persists	Denouncing Mr J.’s collection and treatment of data to the Federal Administrative Court
x5	x5 is a potential course of action undertaken by x2 that is alternative to x3	Mr J. stops data collection and treatment by means of the camera

Table 1: Semantic slots (“argument places”), presuppositions and real events 

Given these semantic slots and their presuppositions, the meaning of the FDPIC’s recommendation coincides with the following entailments:

	x1 notifies x2 that x3 is unlawful
	x1 warns x2 that, because x3 is unlawful, x4 is likely
	x1 informs x2 that x5 would refrain him from doing x4;
	x1 solicits x2 to do x5 and has a preference for x2 following this prescription (=x1 prefers x5 to x4 and prefers x4 to x3).

The semantic-pragmatic analysis of the speech act of recommendation in this specific institutional context, which makes it different from recommendations in ordinary language, is an important step forward in identifying the conditions and factors implied in the FDPIC’s communicative intervention aimed at preventing the escalation of a potential dispute. As a matter of fact, from this analysis, in fact, it becomes clear that the FDPIC (x1) has a preference for Mr J. (x2) to stop the unlawful activity (x3) rather than denouncing him to the Court (x4), thereby assuming the attitude typical of conflict prevention.
Notably, the semantic-pragmatic analysis of “to recommend” performed so far would not be complete, without taking into account an argumentative level. In fact, through the speech act of recommendation, x2 (Mr. J) is invited to make an inference. He is presented with an alternative of two possible courses of action: either Mr. J. applies the suggested measures by stopping the collection and treatment of data (x5), or he could be denounced to the Federal Administrative Court (x4). In creating this alternative, the recommendation invites the addressee (Mr. J.) to reason about the possible courses of action that he can undertake. In this sense, the speech act of recommendation in this specific case could not be fully understood without taking into account this argumentative level. We will go back to this point in section 4.4. 

Also at the argumentative level, we observe that some of the presuppositions and entailments we identified correspond to opinions to which the FDPIC is committed, i.e. to standpoints that need to be supported by argumentation. For example, the entailment that activity x3 is unlawful is an evaluation made by the FDPIC to which he becomes committed once a recommendation is made. In order words, being entailed by the predicate ‘to recommend’, the unlawfulness of x3 constitutes a virtual standpoint, i.e. a claim that may not be asserted as such but can be reconstructed from the felicity conditions (i.e. presuppositions and entailments) of the speech act (see van Eemeren et al. 1993: 122). As a consequence, a large part of the recommendation document issued by the FDPIC is composed of a complex argumentation aimed at demonstrating the unlawfulness of Mr J.’s treatment (see sections 4.2 and 4.3). 

4.	Argumentative analysis

In section 3.3, we saw that the speech act of recommendation in the specific case considered is intrinsically argumentative. In this section, we will thus bring our analysis forward in order to include this argumentative level. Having first outlined the theoretical framework we assume as a starting point for our analysis (section 4.1), we will analyse the complex argumentation supporting the FDPIC’s recommendation (sections 4.2 and 4.3). Finally, we will go back to the speech act of “recommendation” and clarify the inference that Mr. J. is asked to make in argumentative terms, i.e. by interpreting it as an argument based on the “locus from warning” (section 4.4).

4.1.	Theoretical framework

As we have just explained, the text of the recommendation as a whole constitutes a complex argument, which we will analyse by integrating two theoretical approaches: (1) the pragma-dialectical analytic overview; and (2) the inferential configuration based on the Argumentum Model of Topics.  

Through an analytic overview (van Eemeren et al., 1993), we reconstruct the points at issue, the standpoints defended by the arguer, the propositions that are made explicit in order to justify the standpoint, and the structure of these propositions. Specifically, following van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, but see also Snoeck-Henkemans 1997), we distinguish single argumentation from complex argumentation structures, the latter being further specified as multiple, co-ordinative compound and subordinative​[10]​. Reconstructing argumentation structures allows a synthetic overview of how the different premises made explicit in the text are connected to the main standpoint advanced by the FDPIC, namely, that Mr. J’s use of a video camera did not process personal data lawfully (see section 4.2). As we shall see, the argumentation structure in our case includes subordinative argumentation as well as compound and multiple argumentation, including its implicit premises. 

Once the elements of the analytic overview have been elicited, the analysis proceeds with the inferential configuration of the argument-to-standpoint relation, accomplished by means of the Argumentum Model of Topics (AMT, Rigotti and Greco Morasso 2010). Specifically, the AMT takes as a starting point the argumentation structure and focuses on reconstructing the implicit premises that, combined with the explicit premise identified in the argumentation structure, explain the inferential mechanism by which the inference from argument to standpoint is warranted. In comparison to the analytical overview, the AMT allows a more in-depth reconstruction of the inference that is present in argumentation (for a broader discussion, see Rigotti and Greco Morasso 2010; Palmieri 2014; see also the discussion in Bigi and Greco Morasso 2012).

Following the AMT reconstruction, the set of premises justifying the standpoint are divided into two components coinciding with two distinct types of starting point. First, the topical component (also called procedural component, see Rigotti and Greco Morasso 2010) refers to the locus, which is the ontological relation that exists between the content of the argument and the content of the standpoint (e.g. cause-effect, means-goal, whole-part, authority-opinion, etc). It also refers to the maxim, a general inferential principle derived from the locus, which is at work in the specific argument beforehand (e.g. “if the cause is present, the effect takes place”). Second, the material component is made of premises that refer to the cultural-institutional context shared by the participants to the argumentative interaction. In particular, two premises are to be distinguished within the material component. First, an endoxon, so named following the Aristotelian terminology, is a general premise, generally accepted by the interlocutors. Second, the datum, which is a piece of information of factual nature. 

As we will show in section 4.3, distinguishing between qualitatively different premises (procedural and material premises; and again, endoxa and data within material premises) is an add-on of the AMT, which allows for a better understanding of how co-ordinative compound argumentation exactly supports its standpoint. Also, distinguishing between locus and maxim (in the topical or procedural component) allows us to understand not only the abstract type of argument scheme (definition, analogy, etc.) on which the argument is based, but it also helps us specify what type of inferential rule works as a premise in the case beforehand. Due to space limitations, we will provide detailed illustrations of both the analytic overview and the AMT analysis in the next sections when reconstructing what we consider to be the most decisive argumentative moves in the FDPIC’s recommendation. 

4.2.	Argumentation structure of the justification

The main argumentative issue discussed by the Commissioner can already be identified from a contextual analysis, specifically from the semantic-pragmatic analysis of the recommendation outlined in section 3.3. We remarked that the unlawfulness of Mr J.’s treatment is a virtual standpoint claimed by the FDPIC. For similar reasons, Mr. J. can be legitimately expected to object this standpoint by default as he is still using the camera. The resulting initial argumentative situation is as follows:

Issue
p: is Mr J.’s use of the surveillance camera lawful?

Parties and standpoints
FDPIC 
-/p: Mr J.’s use of the surveillance camera is not lawful

Mr. J.
 +/p: Mr J.’s use of the surveillance camera is lawful

Being an attempt to discourage an allegedly unlawful action (see the entailments in the semantic analysis), the main issue is whether Mr. J’s use of the surveillance camera means the lawful or unlawful processing personal data, i.e. whether this treatment fulfils the requirements established by the FADP. Once this issue is resolved, the legal consequences are compelling: if the treatment is proven unlawful, Mr. J. has to terminate his use of the camera. If the Commissioner’s claim is dismissed, the status quo can be kept and Mr. J. can continue to use his camera. 

Before addressing the main issue, however, in part II of the document two preliminary issues are present. The first of them (point 1) concerns the possibility of the FDPIC entering into the merits of the case. Since Mr. J. refuses to cooperate in establishing the facts and such a refusal constitutes a criminal offense according to the FADP, the FDPIC could sue Mr. J. However, because the Commissioner maintains the position that he holds enough evidence to reach a decision, he renounces to denounce Mr. J and opts for writing a recommendation. When seen from an institutional perspective, this decision is particularly interesting. In fact, as discussed in section 3.1, the raison d’être of the FDPIC is to prevent litigation. Accordingly, the FDPIC has a preference for a solution which is alternative to conventional justice, as the semantic analysis of recommendation has brought to light (section 3.3).  

The second preliminary issue – which covers the points 2-4 of Part II – is whether the case falls under the responsibility of the FDPIC. The issue is answered affirmatively, since the recording of images by means of a camera is a treatment of personal data that could wrong a great number of persons, the Commissioner has the authority to intervene. By resolving these two preliminary issues, argumentation fulfils the function of legitimising the main issue in the case at hand.

Then, points 5 and 6 within this part of the document deal with the main issue: “is Mr J.’s use of the surveillance camera lawful?”. In point 5, the Commissioner recalls Art. 13 of the FADP, which states that “A breach of privacy is unlawful unless it is justified by the consent of the injured party, by an overriding private or public interest or by law”. In point 6, the basic principles of data protection established by Art. 4 of the FADP are recalled: personal data may only be processed lawfully, the processing must be proportionate and should have a clear purpose that can be recognized by the people concerned (the cottage’s guests), who should be adequately informed. 

In this way, the FDPIC recalls the conditions that must be fulfilled in order to ensure that treatment is not unlawful as defined by the relevant law. These conditions are that: (a) the processing is proportionate; (b) the processing has a clear and recognizable purpose; (c) the processing is a lawful breach of privacy, which in turn depends on the conditions established in Art. 13 (consent of the injured party, overriding private or public interest, justified by the law).














Figure 1: Argumentation structure of the FDPIC’s recommendation





Points 6a, 6b and 6c of this part of the document aim at determining whether these conditions have been met or not in the case concerned. In point 6a, the FDPIC argues that Mr. J’s use of the camera is not proportionate to the declared purpose of ensuring security. The reasons presented by the Commissioner are that the cottage’s security would have required several cameras rather than only one; and that the camera concerned is situated at a non-strategic point. As the FDPIC remarks, the camera does not film what happens in the cottage but the coming and going to and from the toilets. In point 6b, it is argued that people in the cottage have not been adequately informed about the presence of the camera: the only mention of the presence of a camera is in the leasing contract, which is not directly read by the guests but only by the person renting the cottage. Finally, in point 6c, the Commissioner concludes that the treatment by Mr. J. is unlawful by stating that no law justifies a similar treatment and that such a treatment does not pursue either a public or private interest. 

As a whole, the argumentation structure of the FDPIC’s recommendation can be reconstructed as in Figure 1. As it can be observed, a multiple argumentation, made of three independent reasons, supports the main standpoint advanced by the FDPIC. These three arguments are used to state that each one of the three sufficient conditions for an unlawful personal data processing defined by Art. 4 is present. Then, each of these three arguments is further supported by sub-arguments.

We note in passing that, while each of the three main independent arguments (namely 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 in Figure 1) would be sufficient to maintain the standpoint, it is important for the FDPIC to extensively discuss all three. In fact, the abundance of reasons to support this standpoint makes the FDPIC’s recommendation particularly menacing for Mr. J, who can imagine that his behaviour would be negatively judged by the Federal Administrative Court, should this document be brought to their attention. Additionally, because the three arguments are independent, in order for Mr. J. to refute the FDPIC’s argumentation, he has to refute each one of these arguments separately. Moreover, by means of a multiple argumentation structure, the FDPIC also demonstrates to have made and well thought through decision, in which all relevant factors have been thoroughly examined in relation to the legal framework. This level of critical scrutiny of an issue is what, in general, citizens expect from public authorities to whom the administration of justice is entrusted.
4.3.	An unlawful breach of privacy: inferential configuration 

The argumentation structure presented in Figure 1 shows the main arguments put forward by the Commissioner in order to justify his standpoint that claims the unlawfulness of Mr. J.’s use of the video camera. With the help of the AMT, we shall consider how the argument works at the deeper level of the inferential configuration. First, we need to identify the locus, which is the ontological relation that exists between the content of the standpoint and the content of the explicit premise in the argumentation structure​[11]​. In the case considered in this section, all three arguments 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 refer to the same locus, as in each of them the FDPIC affirms the absence of one of the conditions needed to define a treatment of data as lawful according to the FADP. Hence, the concerned locus is that from definition to the defined term (see Figure 3), which is often present in legal argumentation (cf. Macagno 2010).

Analogously, at a subordinative level, the inferential move that justifies Argument 1.3 is based on a locus from definition. The FDPIC recalls the conditions for an unlawful breach of privacy defined by Art. 13 of the FADP (see the compound argumentation made up of arguments 1.3.1a, 1.3.1b, 1.3.1c and 1.3.1d), which in turn makes the use of the camera an unlawful treatment of personal data. In the following, we will focus on this subordinative level to reconstruct its inferential configuration via the AMT​[12]​. We have chosen to consider this specific level to be analysed by the AMT, because it concerns the problem of Mr. J’s unlawful breach of privacy, which is a focal point of the FDPIC’s recommendation.

The argumentation structure (Figure 1 above) indicates that the sub-standpoint 1.3 “Mr J.’s use of the camera constitutes an unlawful breach of privacy” is supported by a compound sub-argumentation (1.3.1a, 1.3.1b, 1.3.1c and 1.3.1d). Whilst proposition 1.3.1a recalls the principles stated by Art. 13 of the FADP, propositions 1.3.1b – 1.3.1c – 1.3.1.d state that Mr. J.’s behaviour is not in line with these principles. Taken together, these four propositions justify the standpoint thanks to the locus from the definition to the defined term and, more specifically by activating the relevant inferential connection – named maxim – which states that “If and only if X holds the traits established in the definition of p, X is p”. 

In the AMT, maxims are inferential connections deriving from the locus​[13]​, which play the role of major premises that activate an inferential procedure. Locus and maxim qualify the principle of support (Garssen 2001) on whose basis it can be said that the argument beforehand supports the standpoint (Rigotti and Greco Morasso 2010). As Figure 3 shows, the maxim activates a syllogistic structure, which concludes with the standpoint “Mr. J.’s use of a video camera is not a lawful breach of privacy”.






Figure 2: AMT analysis of arguments 1.3.1a, 1.3.1b, 1.3.1c and 1.3.1d

We can observe that whilst the maxim derives from the locus as an implication of the ontological relation between definition and defined, the minor premise (namely: “Mr. J.’s use of a video camera does not have the traits foreseen by the definition of a lawful breach of privacy”) is a statement of fact which refers to the particular issue that has emerged in the context of the FDPIC’s institutional activities. As such, this minor premise requires some backing from this piece of the context, which the AMT always represents with the material component of the inferential configuration. As the left side of AMT analysis in Fig. 2 shows, the material component is constituted by an endoxon and by data. In the FDPIC’s argument, the endoxon refers to the relevant legal framework, namely an excerpt from article 13 of the FADP, which provides the definition of what is lawful in the concerned context. The datum, comprised of the three arguments 1.3.1b, 1.3.1c, and 1.3.1d taken together, refers to the facts about Mr. J’s surveillance activities which have been established by the Commissioner. 

The analysis done with the AMT adds to the reconstruction of the argumentation structure, because it allows identify the specific principle on which these arguments is based; in this case, the locus from definition, which is exploiting one of its possible maxims. The AMT reconstruction also highlights that there is a qualitative difference between premises in compound argumentation when it comes to the inferential configuration of arguments. In the case considered, whilst 1.3.1a works as a major premise (endoxon), the other three arguments (13.1b, 1.3.1c, 1.3.1d) are taken together as factual data that constitute a minor premise. In connection to the general principle, these data allow for the evaluation the breach of privacy operated by Mr. J. Thus, we might conclude that premises that work together in compound argumentation might have qualitatively different functions in the inferential configuration of a specific argument scheme.

Also note that, in general, endoxa tend to remain implicit in argumentative discourse, as they are based on general agreement and can be retrieved from the knowledge of the context by recalling cultural and institutional values, goals and principles. In our particular case, what appears as endoxon in the AMT analysis is actually made explicit in the text of the recommendation (see section 4.2). The FDPIC does not take the legal framework for granted. He reaffirms it in order to frame and legitimize his decision in its relevant juridical background. This is important not only for the Commissioner and Mr J., but also from the perspective of the Federal Administrative Court. The FDPIC offers the Federal Administrative Court a convincing line of interpretation of the events under consideration. 

4.4.	The  “recommendation” as an argument from warning

In the previous section, we have used the AMT to analyse one of the main arguments advanced in support of the FDPIC’s standpoint (recommendation). In this section, we will take a step back to the speech act of recommendation itself, and reconsider the results of the semantic analysis in section 3.3 from an argumentative perspective. We have seen that, pragmatically, the act of recommendation creates an alternative for the person recommended to (Mr J.) between implementing the countermeasures suggested by the FDPIC and the risk of being denounced to the Federal Administrative Court. This move, which is realised by the whole recommendation document if taken as a higher-level illocutionary act, invites Mr. J. to make an inference based on the locus from warning to action (Rigotti, 2009; Rigotti and Greco, forthcoming). In other words, the FDPIC’s recommendation acquires an inherently argumentative function insofar as it invites the addressee to make an inference on the basis of the two alternative courses of action out of which he has now to choose the most preferable one.

The inference that is activated by this form of warning is reconstructed in Figure 3. In general, the locus from warning envisages one agent (the warner) having the power to create a negative situation for another agent (the warned) and deciding to exercise this power only if the warned person will not undertake an action prescribed by the warner. The deriving maxim states that if a person is subject to a similar menace, the prescribed action becomes desirable even if in itself it is not. For Mr. J. (the warned person), the recommendation constitutes an argumentative datum; starting from it, he can use the above-described maxim and conclude that to stop using the camera is desirable. This reasoning is possible only if the underlying endoxon really is a shared premise. The FDPIC calculates that Mr. J. will agree with this endoxon, i.e. that he will prefer to renounce the use of the video camera rather than doing something that will possibly bring him before the Federal Court. 



Figure 3: AMT analysis of the FDPIC’s recommendation as an argument from warning

Thanks to the AMT reconstruction, we can understand what conditions make this warning a sound and effective argument. The proposed inference is valid (i.e. the maxim can be applied) if the hierarchy of values and preferences of Mr. J. is in accordance with the one described in the endoxon. In other words, the recommendation is a real warning for Mr J. only if he considers the risk of being denounced as less desirable than the benefits of using the video camera.  If we look at the datum premise, the warning can be a persuasive argument only if the chances that the FDPIC will bring the case to the Federal Administrative Court are high. In this sense, the AMT reconstruction complements the semantic-pragmatic analysis. In fact, at the perlocutionary level the speech act of recommendation in this case intends to have Mr. J. stop his activities because of the argumentative inference he is presented with.


5.	Conclusive remarks

In this paper, we have analysed a recommendation by the Swiss Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner as a case in point of institutional argumentation with conflict prevention in the field of data protection as its aim. Although the analysis is based on a specific case study, this paper may be of broader interest. In fact, we have shown how an argumentative intervention within a public institution might constitute a possibility to prevent escalation of a potential conflict into a dispute to be brought before court (see Felstiner, Abel and Sarat 1980-81), whereby the economic and social costs of conflict for citizens and society are reduced. Although the case analysed is specific of an institution based in the Swiss Confederation, similar interventions are those of ombudsmen of other public institutions in Europe and beyond. As noted in the opening paragraphs of this article, this is particularly important in the fields of data protection and transparency, which are becoming core aspects of the life of public organizations. 

At the theoretical and methodological levels, central to this paper has been the analysis of the speech act of (justified) recommendation, based both on a semantic-pragmatic account and on argumentation. Recommendation has been analysed as a specific type of speech act, whose pragmatic nature is different from that what is normally understood under this term in everyday language. During this analysis, we proposed that the term recommendation in the case of the FDPIC assumes a specific meaning, which is close enough to ombudsmen’s recommendations. In fact, it is known that the accuracy of the FDPIC’s argumentation in support of his recommendation will be transmitted to the Federal Administrative Court, should the concerned addressee not accept it. In this sense, the FDPIC’s recommendation, as we have shown via a semantic as well as argumentative analysis (see sections 3.2 and 4.4 respectively), is close to a form of warning. It is a speech act of argumentative nature, because it invites the addressee to make an inferential step about the possible courses of action that he might think of choosing. This is why we maintain that the semantic-pragmatic analysis and the argumentative analysis in this case go hand in hand. In fact, as shown, in this particular context, the illocutionary force of the speech act of recommendation could not be fully explained if not by considering it as a specific type of speech act that is an argumentative act (as done in section 4.4). The intended effect of the speech act of recommendation (in this specific context) would not be completely explained, if one does not take into account the argumentative inference that the addressee is invited to draw in this case (section 4.4). Therefore, speech act is inherently argumentative. 

Moreover, in order for this speech act to fully exploit its perlocutionary force, i.e. to be persuasive for the addressee, it needs to be supported by a complex web of reasons that motivate the fact that the alternatives presented to Mr. J. are compelling (see sections 4.2 and 4.3). In this sense, the whole text we have analysed is argumentative. In particular, the FDPIC counts three independent reasons (1.1, 1.2 and 1.3, see Figure 2), each being sufficient to support his standpoint. Mentioning three arguments instead of one is not superfluous if we take the warning function of the FDPIC’s recommendation into consideration. In fact, by means of such abundance of arguments against him, Mr. J is implicitly invited to acknowledge that his chances of being condemned by the Federal Administrative Court would be high were the case come before court​[14]​.

As for future research, the recommendation analyzed here could be compared to other types of documents produced by the FDPIC, especially his interventions in the field of mediation (section 3.1). Also, it could be compared to other types of recommendation issued by similar institutions in other countries. By doing this, it would be possible to elicit argumentative and pragmatic specificities of each type of text, thus increasing our knowledge about the pragmatic and argumentative dynamics of different Alternative Dispute Resolution practices.
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1.3 
Mr. J’s use of a video camera is not a lawful breach of privacy

1.3.1a
(Art. 13.1 FADP) A breach of privacy is unlawful unless it is justified with the consent of the injured party; an overriding private or public interest; or by law

1.3.1b
The injured party has not given consent to Mr. J. to use a video camera

1.2
People have not been adequately informed

1.2.1a
No information is provided about the camera except a mention on the rental contract. However, this is not read by guests

1.2.1b
The information on the contract is incomplete and it does not for making a decision full awareness of the facts

1 
Mr. J’s use of the surveillance camera is not lawful

1.1
Mr. J.’s use of a video camera is not proportional to the goal of security

1.2.1
There is only one camera

1.1.2.
This camera is placed at a non-strategic point

1.3.1c
Mr. J.’s use of a video camera does not pursue an overriding private or public interest

1.3.1d
There is no law justifying this type of treatment

Datum: Mr. J’s uses of a video camera constitutes a breach of privacy where there is no consent of the injured party, no overriding private or public interest and no law justifying it.

Locus from the definition to the defined term

Final conclusion: Mr. J.’s use of a video camera is not a lawful breach of privacy 

Endoxon: To be [defined as] lawful, a breach of privacy must be justified by the consent of the injured party, or pursue an overriding private or public interest; or be justified by law

First Conclusion/ Minor Premise: Mr. J.’s use of a video camera does not have the traits foreseen by the definition of a lawful breach of privacy

Maxim: If and only if X holds the traits foreseen by the definition of p, X is p. 

Datum: The FDPIC has sent Mr. J. a recommendation to cease the collection of personal data by means of the camera. If he does not do so, the FDPIC could bring the case before the Federal Administrative Court

Locus from 
warning to action

Final conclusion: It becomes desirable for Mr. J. to stop the collection of personal data using the camera

Endoxon: For Mr. J. the possible charge by the FPIC to the Federal Administrative Court represents a negative alternative to ceasing the collection of personal data (where ceasing is not desirable in itself but preferable to being charged)

First conclusion/Minor premise: The FDPIC has manifested his decision to create a negative situation (NS) for Mr. J. in case Mr. J. does not cease the collection of personal data by means of the camera (where ceasing is not desirable in itself but preferable to the SN)

Maxim: If agent X manifests his decision to create a negative situation (NS) for agent Y in case Y does not accomplish action A (which is not desirable in itself but preferable to NS), action A becomes desirable for Y
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^1	  See http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf, last visited: April 14th, 2016.
^2	  See https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/, last visited 14th April 2016.
^3	  In a later paper, Searle defines an institution as “any system of constitutive rules of the form: X counts as Y in C” (Searle 2005: 10).
^4	  https://www.edoeb.admin.ch/org/00125/index.html?lang=en HYPERLINK "http://www.edoeb.admin.ch/org/00125/index.html?lang=en" , last visited September 2016.
^5	  The whole text concerning the FDPIC’s functions is available at: http://www.edoeb.admin.ch/org/00126/index.html?lang=en, last visited April 2016. Note also that recommendations are not the only type of document that the FDPIC can issue on his own initiative. He might for example write a letter asking questions in order to verify whether data protection is guaranteed, as he did on 19th June 2013, when he wrote to the direction of Google in order to ask about the implications of the implementation of Google Glass (see file:///C:/Users/owner/Downloads/Letter_to_Google_regarding_Glass-FR%20(1).pdf, the text of the letter is in French, last visited July 2014).
^6	  Original title: “RECOMMANDATION conformément à l’article 29 de la loi fédérale du 19 juin 1992 sur la protection des données (FADP; RS 235.1) concernant une caméra de surveillance installée dans le Chalet SJ à C., propriété de la Société Chalet SJ (Sàrl) représentée par Monsieur J, domicilié à P.”
^7	  We note in passing that cooperation between Switzerland and France on this case might also be seen as a sign of the importance of the transnational importance of institutions assuring data protection in different countries (see the discussion in section 1).
^8	  This semantic notion of ‘argument’ should not be confused with the use of the same term within argumentation theory. In semantics, arguments are entities being in the mode described by the predicate and argument places are the corresponding semantic slots these entities fill; in argumentation theory, arguments are reasons advanced in defence of a standpoint.
^9	  “Argument place” is intended here in its semantic value, which is also possible to render by the equivalent “semantic slot”. In this case, “argument” has nothing to do with “argumentation”.
^10	  The most important works dealing with the structure of argumentation are comprehensively reviewed by Snoeck Henkemans (2000).
^11	  The term ontological as used here refers to the fact that loci which are present in argumentative reasoning mirror relations existing outside argumentative discourse, such as cause-effect, analogous-analogous, means-end, etc.
^12	  The procedure for moving from the pragma-dialectical argumentation structure to the AMT’s inferential configuration has been explained more in detail in prior work (Rigotti and Palmieri, 2010; Palmieri, 2014), while numerous contributions now exist that have applied this kind of analysis in several argumentative contexts (see for example Greco Morasso 2011 and Palmieri 2014). 
^13	  The locus is not part of the set of premises justifying a standpoint, but it is an integral part of the inferential configuration as it constitutes the ontological place from which the maxim derives. We could say that the locus feeds the logical form of the maxim (“if…then”) with general ontological categories like definition, cause, analogy, etc. 
^14	  Pragmatically, in this sense, the Federal Court is also an indirect potential addressee of this text.
